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FIDELITY AS INTEGRITY: COLLOQUY
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: Let me start with two observations. It
is, of course, intriguing to hear in the span of such a short time the
following accusations: that I play fast and loose with the Constitution;
that I don't play loose and fast enough with the Constitution; that I
am too wedded to text; that I am not sufficiently wedded to text; and
that I don't practice what I preach. The usual thing to say in such
circumstances, you have heard it many times, is that I must be doing
something right. My own reaction is, I must be doing something mysterious. We'll see.

Some of the remarks which I am about to make may sound to you
as if I don't like the idea of the old Dworkin and the new one, the
earlier and the later one. It is not really that I don't like the idea. I
think that most everything that I am arguing now can be found in a
book I published in the 1970s. 1 But I am not going to resist the idea
that that's not so, that there really have been great changes, which
suggests freshness and vitality, which is obviously not something I
wish to disown. And, of course, the leading example in philosophy of
someone at war with his earlier self is so flattering that I can't possibly
oppose it.
[In the colloquium, Professor Dworkin replied to the comments of
Professors McConnell, Schauer, West, and Fleming, revised versions
of which are published in the Reply which follows the final panel in
this book.' But since Professor Dworkin has expanded his replies to
these authors (as well as his comments on Professor Rubenfeld's remarks) into his Reply, the colloquy of his replies to these individuals is
omitted here.]
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Any questions from the audience?
QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: I am attracted by Professor Dworkin's assault on pragmatism. And I would like to hear him
refine it somewhat, particularly against the context of the common law
tradition of constitutional adjudication. For instance, the recent Colorado case [Romer v. Evans] could have dealt with Bowers v. Hardwick.4 While I am attracted to the result, it flies in the face of the idea

from the common law, that courts only resolve questions necessary to
adjudicate the claim brought before them by the parties. And I
would like to hear how Professor Dworkin would ascertain limits.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: Yes. That's a very important question,
of course. We should proceed case by case in the common law tradition. Let's see what that means. To my mind the common law tradi1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
2. See Ronald Dworkin, Reflections on Fidelity, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1799 (1997).
3. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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tion required judges-this was its nerve and strength-to identify a
principle sufficient to justify what they were doing on that occasion,
and to recognize the implications of adopting that principle for other
cases.
I put it that way to distinguish a more ambitious idea, which is that
they should take the occasion, not just to state principles necessary to
decide that very case, but to state principles not necessary to decide
that case but which are appealing or indeed even natural continuations of those that are necessary. I'm drawn to the view that-except
in rare cases, where the community really has a very important reason
for knowing-the second is bad practice. But that doesn't meant that
the first is bad practice. Indeed, I think the first is essential.
In Romer v. Evans, the court laid down a principle-it wasn't necessarily so articulate, but I have tried to dig it out and present it-which
was necessary to decide that case, and it was inconsistent with Bowers
v. Hardwick. So, acknowledging the inconsistency would to my mind
have been adopting the first of the two practices I distinguished, not
the second. It would have been recognizing integrity. Integrity
doesn't require you to take on issues not at stake in the case. It does
require you to recognize what is at stake in the case and to test the
principle you are deploying by seeing how it applies in other cases.
And I agree partially with Justice Scalia's remarks in that case. It
did seem to me an abdication of a certain responsibility not to acknowledge that this principle was one that condemned a very important prior decision. Now, to a certain degree some notion of
statesmanship might come in. If the court had said, Bowers is, of
course, a different case, it stands--it flourishes as ever it did-then
that would have been seriously unprincipled and integrity would have
condemned it. Simply to have allowed people to understand that this
case was doomed, and not even to have mentioned it, may have been
an act of statesmanship, though it doesn't appeal to me.
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR LEVINSON: Professor Dworkin was kind enough to mention that I have criticized him in the past
for having a predilection for happy endings. I would like to pick up on
the hitherto ignored Third Amendment, which I think is a fascinating
feature of the Constitution. It says-Akhil Amar always carries a
copy of the Constitution with him, and I read from his copy-"No
Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." It seems to me that this stands for the incredibly
important principle that in time of war the Constitution is not silent.
Then I turn to the Emancipation Proclamation, which is based on war
power without any other authorization, and indeed Lincoln had earlier suggested that he didn't have the power. Justice Curtis, who of
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course dissented in Scott v. Sandford,5 believed that the president did
not have the power simply to emancipate the most important property
asset of southerners, including loyal southerners. So, the real question
is, is it possible that Hercules, when presented with the issue "was the
Emancipation Proclamation constitutional," could turn to the Third
Amendment for moral guidance and be forced to the dreadfully unhappy conclusion that the Emancipation Proclamation was in fact
unconstitutional?
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: Yes, and maybe even wouldn't need
the Third Amendment to do it. But it is very important-and you
remind us of an extremely important occasion that illustrates it-it is
very important to distinguish between the gravitational force, as I
have called it, of a constitutional provision and its correct translation.
In Freedom's Law, I denied that it would be a good translation of
the Third Amendment itself to say it requires, or it is the source of, a
general right of privacy. That seems to me an interpretive mistake.
The linguistic intention, I think, was very different.
But you are absolutely right, it doesn't follow from that that in asking the question, how do we make most sense of the document as a
whole, we shouldn't recognize that here was an occasion in which it
was asserted that the Constitution holds sway even in war time. Absolutely right. I call that gravitational force, meaning the fact that that
provision is there and did that thing, is pertinent to and maybe decisive of the correct interpretation of other more general clauses and
issues. So, I agree.
PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: What I would be inclined to say is
that it is very probable that the Third Amendment was referring to
one's own citizens and not the citizens of a power against whom one is
waging war, and that the theory behind the Emancipation Proclamation was that since we were waging war against these people, the
seizure of their property was intended to effectuate the successful effort of the conflict and, therefore, is not at all inconsistent with the
Third Amendment.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: That's a Confederate argument; it certainly wasn't Lincoln's argument that Virginians were no longer
citizens.
PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: No, what I am saying is that Lincoln could not have seized the property of loyal Yankees on our side,
but the Third Amendment doesn't say anything about quartering
soldiers in the homes of enemy countries against whom we are waging
war.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: But the Emancipation Proclamation
applied to loyal southerners.
5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: No, it did not. There were still
slaves held in Kentucky and Delaware until the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: But the Emancipation Proclamation
did not exempt loyal southerners. It may not have been enforced
against them.
PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: No, it specifically applied only in
the territories of the rebellion.
PROFESSOR AMAR: That's to loyal citizens even in those
territories.
PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: Right.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: Good. History has some use, thank
you.
QUESTION FROM ROBERT LIPKIN: I would like to know if
this a correct understanding of your view, Professor Dworkin, that
since the translation of the Constitution requires not finding out what
they meant or what the Constitution means, properly understood, is it
conceivable then that fidelity to the Constitution could mean infidelity
to what the framers thought it meant?
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: No. Well, that's a possible view. Mr.
Justice Derrida might take that view. But I don't. Again I am insisting on something that I think is mysteriously neglected, and that is the
distinction between two issues about the intentions of people. I am
trying to distinguish between the linguistic intention and the political-as I've called it today, I have called it different things at different
times-intentions.
First, McConnell at some point said he would like to know why I
pay so much attention to intention, speaker's intention, in answer to
the first of these questions, what does the Constitution say? And it is
because I think there has got to be an identity constraint. There has
to be. We have to give sense to the notion, what is this document to
which we are being faithful? And if we say that it is the document
manifest in a certain canonical set of inscriptions, then we have to
answer the further question, what words does it contain?
I used an example on Wednesday night that is often used in opposition to my views about interpretation, I think wrongly. There is a passage in ParadiseLost in which Milton refers to Satan and his gay
hordes. And the question is, what does that say? Does that say that
Satan's hordes were jolly or that they were homosexual? To my mind
it has got to say the first, or in any case it can't say the second, because
the connotation of homosexual to gay post-dated Milton's life by a
very long time. Now, if a scholar here, some historian, says I am
wrong about that, then the question is back in play. Suppose I am
right about that, then that's ineligible. It is because there has to be an
answer to the question, what words make up the document? These
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are two words, gay meaning jolly and gay meaning homosexual, and
I've got to decide which is the word that is in the text if I am going to
offer an understanding of ParadiseLost.
I take the same view about the Constitution or any canonical legal
document. But, of course, when people say, well, aren't you in danger
of departing from what they meant-typically, for example, in Scalia's
writing on intention-it is a typical confusion between intended to say
and intended to be the result. Yes, the people who adopted, whoever
they may be, the Eighth Amendment certainly did not intend to outlaw capital punishment. We have absolutely convincing evidence that
that was not part of their expectation intention. However, what they
said and intended to say might very well have outlawed capital punishment. That's the difference.
PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: May I jump in here? I think this
idea that we are not looking either for what they meant, or what we
mean, but for what the words mean. I think is an example of Professor
Dworkin not fully assimilating the view that there is no "the" moral
reading. That is to say, a phrase like equal protection of the laws, that
is words, and when different people attach different understandings to
those same sets of words, it is simply not accurate to say that there is a
correct meaning of those words. All we can say is, what do certain
people mean when they use those words, and then the question becomes, by what right do we, if we happen to hold particular office, say
as a federal judge, say that what we think those words mean has a
superior claim against what our fellow citizens think that they mean?
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: Can I just say quickly-I apologize, go
ahead.
PROFESSOR SCHAUER: It may be that we were going to say the
same thing. I think Professor McConnell is wrong in his understanding of what it is for a word to mean something. He has collapsed the
distinction between speakers' meaning and utterance meaning. To
have a linguistic intention is to intend to use a certain kind of convention. The very existence of the convention presupposes at least some
degree of sharing. If it turns out that the meaning of every word is
what the user of the word intends it to mean, without reference to
intention-independent linguistic conventions, it is hard to understand
how we can talk to each other.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: Or disagree with one another.
PROFESSOR SCHAUER: Or disagree with one another for that
matter. So, it is certainly possible that there will exist in the language
certain noises or marks on a printed page as to which there is so little
agreement that they are essentially meaningless. But it is also possible
that there are noises or words on a printed page as to which there is
substantial shared meaning, even in the face of outliers or disagreement or whatever, or even in the face of disagreement about a very
concrete reference.
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I think on this issue Dworkin and I agree that there is a convention
about words like "equal" and the like, and the fact that in some other
domain people may have different meanings for the word, or the fact
that there are outliers, doesn't mean that the word has no meaning,
nor does it mean that the meaning of the word collapses completely
into the specific or even the general intentions of speakers.
PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: The shared meanings are not the
problem in constitutional cases. I fully agree that there are certain
aspects that every view, from the framers, up through ours and presumably including the Grand Kleagle's view, of equal will be the
same. That's not what we fight about. The question is, when do we
identify different meanings that reasonable people have held through
time? And then to say that one of those meanings is "the" meaning
seems to me simply inaccurate.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: Could I intervene just a second? It
seems to me that the important point here is the possible misuse you
have made of the word "meaning," because we have got always to
distinguish between differences in sense and differences in judgment.
It is extremely difficult sometimes, but the whole sense of agreeing or
disagreeing depends upon that distinction.
When you say people mean different things by equal citizenship, it
would be more accurate, at least more helpful in thinking about these
problems, to say they have different theories about what equal citizenship consists in, and, of course, I agree with that. Their theories about
what equal citizenship consists in disagree with one another. But, we
cannot collapse the idea of people having different understandings of
what the terms require into their meaning something different by the
terms, because if we do that we have to say that these deep disagreements among us aren't disagreements at all, they are simply people
talking past one another, as if you and I were arguing about the correct understanding of ParadiseLost and I meant jolly and you meant
homosexual.
Now, I keep pounding this-I fear I'm pounding it-because I
would very much like you to put the matter in the following way. The
correct translation of what the framers' said is that they commanded
equal citizenship. That leaves open this question. What reasons do
we have for accepting the framers' own answer to the question: What
is equal citizenship? Many answers can be given. I don't like any of
them, but some can be given. But to put the point by saying that
everybody means something different by equal citizenship so that the
words themselves mean nothing, makes the point drain into the sand.
PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: Excuse me, it is you who made use
of the rhetorical proposition that we don't look at what they meant, or
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what we meant, but what it meant. And all I say is that is a useless
proposition.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: I never said that. I don't accept a
sharp distinction between what words mean and what the speaker intends them to mean. Perhaps you are remembering my statement that
I'm interested in the answer to what equal citizenship is, not what people think it is. But that's obviously a very different distinction.

6. Fidelity as Integrity: Colloquy, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1357, 1360 (1997) (Professor Dworkin: "I am not interested in what we think, I am interested in the right
answer to the question, what is equal citizenship properly understood?).

